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Introduction		In	a	series	of	lectures	Dr.	Ben	S.	Bernanke1,	the	former	Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	 discussed	 the	 two	 main	 responsibilities	 of	 central	 banks-financial	stability	and	economic	stability.	 	Financial	stability	is	achieved	by	central	banks	standing	ready	to	act	as	 lenders	of	 last	resort	by	providing	short-term	liquidity	to	 financial	 institutions,	 replacing	 lost	 funding.	 For	 economic	 stability,	 the	principal	tool	is	monetary	policy;	in	normal	times	that	involves	adjusting	short-term	interest	rates.		Dr.	Bernanke	admits	 that	when	 the	U.S.	 financial	 crisis	occurred	 in	2007-2008,	no	government	entity	was	 in	overall	control	of	 the	measures	that	needed	to	be	taken	to	counteract	the	crisis.	This	was	seen	as	a	managerial	shortcoming.			There	were	various	other	factors	at	play,	which	made	it	difficult	for	governments	to	deal	with	and	contain	the	crisis.	The	demand	for	new	homes	seemed	to	be	out	of	touch	with	reality.	The	shift	in	borrowing	patterns	for	new	homes	was	taken	for	granted	rather	than	being	scrutinized.	The	freedom	to	introduce	poor	quality	mortgage	 products	was	 left	 unchallenged.	 The	widespread	 conversion	 of	 long-term	mortgage	debt	into	daily	liquidity	products	through	securitization	was	also	left	to	market	forces.	However	what	resulted	in	the	financial	crisis	being	unduly	prolonged	and	at	much	greater	expense	was	that,	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	focus	on	support	for	lenders,	no	serious	consideration	was	given	to	help	the	legions	of	mortgage	borrowers	who	found	themselves	in	trouble.		Financial	 stability	won	 over	 economic	 stability;	 put	 simply,	 there	was	 no	 plan	ready	to	be	 implemented	to	assist	 the	21.3	million	households	who	were	 faced	with	 foreclosure	proceedings	during	 the	period	2006-2013.	There	was	 also	no	plan	 for	 the	 homeowners	 of	 the	 5.8	 million	 homes	 that	 were	 repossessed.	Financial	 stability	 measures	 were	 not	 for	 the	 short	 term	 either.	 	 The	 balance	sheet	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 as	 at	 7th	 January	 2016	 still	 shows	 a	 holding	 of	$1.747	trillion	in	mortgage-backed	securities	and	$2.461	trillion	in	U.S.	Treasury	securities;	several	years	after	 they	were	acquired.	For	 the	mortgage	sector	 this	still	represents	18.5%	of	all	outstanding	mortgages	as	at	same	date.		In	September	2007,	a	few	members	of	Congress	pushed	for	direct	federal	aid	to	help	 homeowners	 in	 trouble,	 but	 most	 members	 did	 not	 want	 to	 spend	substantial	 taxpayers	 funds	 on	 the	 problem.	With	 the	 benefit	 of	 hindsight,	 the	latter	view	may	be	 regarded	as	 a	 serious	error	of	 judgment.	As	 this	paper	will	show,	the	total	costs	of	helping	homeowners	in	trouble	would	have	been	$1.173	trillion	 over	 the	 period	 2007-2013,	 which	 is	 less	 than	 the	 $1.747	 trillion	 in	mortgage	 bonds	 still	 on	 the	 books	 of	 the	 Fed.	 More	 importantly	 the	 U.S.	government	 debt	 increase	would	 have	much	 lower	 than	 the	 nearly	 $9	 trillion	over	the	period	2007-2014.	The	only	choice	on	the	table	should	not	be	between																																																											11	The	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Financial	Crisis,	lectures	by	Ben	S.	Bernanke,	Princeton	University	Press,	ISBN	978-0-691-16557-8,	Edition	2013.	
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																																																													CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		economic	 growth	 or	 inflation,	 but	 between	 individual	 households’	 income	stability	or	instability.		Income	instability	is	a	major	cause	of	recessions.																																																														
1	Demand	and	supply	in	the	U.S.	housing	market	
	
	
1.1	The	demand	for	new	housing	units	in	the	U.S.	
	In	November	2007	 three	members	 –Eris	 S.	 Belsky,	Rachel	Bogardus	Drew	and	Daniel	 McCue-	 of	 the	 Joint	 Center	 for	 Housing	 Studies	 of	 Harvard	 University	wrote	 a	 paper©	about	 the	 “Underlying	Demand	 for	New	Housing	Units2	in	 the	U.S.	 for	 the	 period	 2007-2014”.	 	 The	 writers	 specified	 three	 reasons	 for	 the	demand	 level	 of	 new	 housing	 units:	 (i)	 The	 demand	 for	 additional	 units	 to	accommodate	the	growth	in	the	number	of	households;	(ii)	The	demand	for	new	units	 to	 replace	 existing	 units	 lost	 from	 the	 stock	 of	 houses	 for	 one	 reason	 or	another,	 including	 fire,	 weather	 conditions,	 floods;	 and	 (iii)	 The	 demand	 for	additional	 second	homes	and	vacant	units	 for	rent	or	sale	 to	accommodate	 the	normal	turnover	of	a	large	housing	stock.		Under	several	assumptions,	they	concluded	that	the	demand	level	for	the	period	2008-2014	would	be	a	demand	for	1.82	million	new	housing	units	annually.	 In	this	paper	 the	 figure	of	1.8	million	has	been	used.	This	number	 represents	 the	level	 of	 housing	 starts	 that	 are	 needed	 to	 keep	 up	 with	 population	 growth,	changes	in	household	size	and	in	the	age	composition	of	the	population.		It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	demand	 for	new	housing	units,	 the	income	 level	 of	 individual	 households	was	not	mentioned	 and	neither	was	 the	applicable	 mortgage	 rate.	 The	 latter	 are	 economic	 variables	 that	 have	 a	significant	bearing	on	whether	the	target	demand	level	is	reached.	The	economic	but	also	the	social	objective	of	policy	makers	should	be	to	facilitate	the	pursuit	of	the	 ‘American	Dream’	and	help	all	those	aiming	to	get	on	the	housing	ladder	to	do	so	with	the	result	that	the	1.8	million	new	homes	are	built	annually.	Enabling	most	of	 them	 to	 stay	 in	 their	homes	at	 times	of	 economic	 stress	 should	be	 the	second	aim.		The	first	fact	is	that	when	economic	variables	cause	that	the	level	of	demand	is	not	met,	the	desired	demand	level	remains	unchanged.	A	supply	gap	arises.		The	second	fact	is	that	when	supply	does	not	satisfy	demand	levels,	house	prices	have	a	tendency	to	increase	faster	than	in	previous	periods.	 	House	price	levels	become	 an	 obstacle	 rather	 than	 an	 equalizer	 in	 bringing	 supply	 and	 demand	together.	Lower	and	median	incomes	do	not	keep	pace	with	house	price	inflation	levels.	The	need	for	new	homes	remains	unchanged,	but	the	price	per	new	home																																																											2	http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w07-7.pdf	
	 5	
																																																																CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			deters	more	 and	more	 individual	 households.	 Rent	 levels	 usually	 follow	house	price	levels.		The	 third	 fact	 is	 that	 under-supply	 of	 new	 homes	 coupled	 with	 rapidly	 rising	house	prices	requires	increased	mortgage	borrowing	levels	in	order	to	get	onto	the	 housing	 ladder.	 Future	 income	 levels,	 especially	 of	 the	 lower	 and	 median	income	classes,	will	be	reduced	disproportionally	compared	to	previous	periods.	Consumption	levels	of	other	goods	and	services	will	suffer.		The	fourth	fact	is	that	base	rate	adjustments	in	relation	to	the	housing	markets	are	 ineffective	 in	 that	 they	 focus	 on	 the	 supply	 side	 of	 funds,	 accelerating	 or	slowing	down	mortgage	lending	rather	than	encouraging	more	new	home	starts.	A	 supply	 gap	 cannot	be	overcome	with	 the	 interest	 rate	 tool	 alone.	One	of	 the	main	causes	behind	house	price	rises	is	the	lack	of	sufficient	new	housing	starts.		Fighting	 house	 price	 increases	 with	 the	 interest	 rate	 tool	 does	 not	 encourage	more	home	starts;	the	effect	is	rather	the	opposite.		When	such	an	important	market	as	the	housing	market	does	not	behave	like	an	ordinary	market	in	that	demand	levels	encourage	supply,	conventional	economic	theories	of	how	to	adjust	such	market	is	also	likely	to	fall	short	of	the	mark.			The	 aim	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 set	 out	what	 can	 be	 done	 to	 bring	 back	 a	 demand	driven	market,	whereby	lending	booms	do	not	lead	to	housing	busts.		
1.2	The	demand	for	new	housing	units	in	the	U.K.		In	the	U.K.	the	annual	demand	level	is	at	least	260,000	new	homes	according	to	the	Barker	 review.	Since	1997	 the	U.K.	never	achieved	 this	 level.	The	closest	 it	came	to	260,000	was	in	2006	when	219,000	homes	were	built.		The	 Barker	 Review	 of	 Housing	 Supply3	published	 its	 final	 report	 on	 the	 17th	March	2004.	The	report	was	authored	by	economist	Kate	Barker	and	presented	recommendations	to	the	UK	government	for	securing	future	housing	needs.	The	findings	of	the	report	were:		
• That	 the	U.K.	 had	 a	 level	 of	 new	homes	being	 constructed	of	 140,00	annually.		
• That	the	UK	had	experienced	a	long-term	upward	trend	of	2.4%	in	real	house	prices	over	the	past	30	years.																																																																																						3	http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/barker_review_execsum_91.pdf		
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• 								In	order	to	reduce	this	rate	of	increase	to	1.8%	an	additional 70,000																																																																																															houses	in	England	are	required.	
• In	order	 to	 reduce	 this	 rate	 to	 the	EU	average	of	1.1%	an	additional	120,000	houses	each	year	may	be	required.		The	policy	recommendations	outlined	in	the	report	were:		
• For	government	to	set	a	goal	for	improved	market	affordability.	
• Between	 £1.2	 -	 £1.6	 billion	 of	 additional	 funding	 per	 annum	 to	 meet	predicted	social	housing	needs.	
• Implementation	 of	 a	 planning	 gain	 supplement	 to	 capture	 some	 of	 the	benefits	of	development	for	the	community.	
• Establishment	 of	 a	 Regional	 Planning	 Executive	 to	 advise	 the	 Regional	Planning	Body	on	the	scale	and	distribution	of	housing	required	meeting	the	market	affordability	target.	
• Allocation	 of	 additional	 land	 in	 Local	 Development	 Frameworks,	 which	could	be	released	by	market	triggers.	
• Establishment	 of	 a	 Community	 Infrastructure	 Fund	 to	 help	 to	 unlock	some	of	the	barriers	to	development.	
• Limited	term	retention	of	council	tax	by	local	authorities	for	new	housing	developments	to	promote	growth	and	cover	transitional	costs.			As	 a	 result	 of	 recommendations	 made	 in	 the	 Barker	 Review,	 the	 National	Housing	and	Planning	Advice	Unit	was	formed.	
	
1.3	Supply	in	the	U.S	housing	market	1997-2015	
	The	following	table	shows	the	annual	new	privately	owned	housing	units	started	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1997-2015.		
Table	1.	New	housing	starts	in	the	U.S	from	1997-to	date.		Year		 Annual		Housing	Starts	x	Thousand	
Year	 Annual	Housing	Starts	x	Thousand	
Year	 Annual	Housing	Starts	x	Thousand	1997	 1,474.0	 2004	 1,955.8	 2011	 			608.8			1998	 1,616.9	 2005	 2,068.3	 2012	 			780.6	1999	 1,640.9	 2006	 1,800.9	 2013	 			924.9	2000	 1,568.7	 2007	 1,355.0	 2014	 1,003.3	2001	 1,602.7	 2008	 			905.5	 2015	 1,206.0*	2002	 1,704.9	 2009	 			554.0	 	 	2003	 1,847.7	 2010	 			586.9	 	 		*September	2015	figures	on	an	annualized	basis.																																																												
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																																																											CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Only	 in	 4	 years	 during	 the	 19-year	 period	 did	 the	 level	 of	 new	 housing	 starts	reach	the	1.8	million	of	new	homes	being	built.	The	needed	1.8	million	homes	are	not	 based	 on	 the	 usual	 market	 supply-demand	 considerations.	 A	 lower	 house	price	level	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	a	higher	demand	level	for	new	homes,	but	a	higher	price	level	will	deter	a	number	of	potential	buyers	as	lower	and	median	incomes	can	no	longer	support	those	prices.	The	demand	level	for	new	homes	is	relatively	 fixed	 by	 the	 growth	 in	 population,	 the	 shift	 in	 family	 and	 age	composition	 and	 the	 changes	 caused	 by	 different	 home	 quality	 requirements.	The	supply	level	can	be	influenced	by	home	repossessions.		Three	 elements	 played	 a	 role	 in	 why	 the	 volume	 of	 new	 homes	 built	 was	insufficient	to	satisfy	demand	levels.	The	first	one	is	the	scarcity	factor.	Scarcity	in	new	home	construction	–the	situation	that	the	number	of	new	homes	built	is	below	 the	demand	 level-	 leads	 to	suppressed	demand.	Usually	 such	a	 situation	pushes	 up	 prices	 of	 existing	 homes	 faster	 than	would	 have	 occurred	 if	 annual	demand	had	been	met.	The	scarcity	factor	also	leads	to	construction	companies	considering	whether	postponing	new	home	starts	will	be	beneficial	 in	 financial	terms.	 This	 is	 especially	 relevant	 when	 construction	 companies	 are	simultaneously	 large	 landowners.	 The	 construction	 companies’	 profit	 motive	may	conflict	with	the	desire	to	increase	new	construction	levels.		By	 way	 of	 example,	 in	 the	 U.K.	 as	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2015,	 the	 nine	 biggest	 house	builders	in	Britain	had	615,152	housing	plots	that	have	not	been	developed.	This	is	four	times	the	total	number	of	homes	built	in	2014.4		Secondly,	house	prices	are	inextricably	linked	to	incomes.	In	particular,	if	house	prices	 rise	 faster	 than	median	 incomes,	newcomers	 to	 the	housing	market	will	have	to	allocate	a	higher	and	higher	percentage	of	their	 incomes	in	order	to	be	able	to	buy	a	home.	Other	types	of	goods	and	services	consumption	will	suffer	as	a	consequence.	The	breaking	point	comes	when	a	larger	and	larger	share	of	the	new	entrants	no	longer	can	afford	such	house	acquisition	and	have	to	resort	to	renting.		The	third	element	 is	the	interest	rate	applied	to	a	mortgage.	The	base	rate	sets	the	tone	for	banks	to	decide	the	level	of	mortgage	interest	rates	charged.		From	2004	 the	 Fed	 applied	 a	 gradual	 base	 rate	 rise	 from	a	1%	 in	2004	 to	 5.25%	 in	2006.	Such	a	 rise	had	a	 strong	 impact	on	 the	costs	of	borrowing	 for	 individual	households.	What	the	Fed	and	other	regulators	failed	to	do	was	to	stop	the	banks	lending	excessively.	They	did	not	 control	 the	mortgage	products	on	offer;	 they	did	not	impose	increased	reserve	requirements	on	mortgage	lending	levels	and	they	 did	 not	 stop	 the	 investment	 banks	 turning	 long-term	mortgage	 risks	 into	daily	market	liquidity	risks.	The	latter	was	done	through	the	mortgage-backed																																																																																																																							4	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/615000-new-homes-thats-what-uk-housebuilders-could-put-up-on-their-landbanks-a6791486.html	
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																																																													CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		securitization	 process	whereby	 low	 and	 high-risk	mortgages	were	 repackaged	and	sold	off	in	high	volumes	throughout	the	global	financial	system.	When	some	high-risk	mortgages	were	no	 longer	 serviced,	 liquidity	 in	 the	mortgage	backed	security	 markets	 disappeared	 and	 the	 long-term	 risk	 of	 mortgage	 loans	 was	turned	into	an	instant	loss	for	investors.		In	 conclusion	 economic	 policies	 are	 needed,	 which	 focus	 on	 the	 level	 of	 new	housing	starts	needed	to	meet	demand,	rather	than	actions	that	ultimately	make	mortgage	loans	more	expensive	thereby	harming	demand.		
1.4	The	funding	side		Table	2	sets	out	the	new	borrowing	levels	used	for	new	housing	starts	as	well	as	for	funding	house	price	increases	in	the	U.S	during	the	period	1997-2015.		
Table	2:	Increase/decrease	in	outstanding	mortgage	levels	in	the	U.S.	over	
the	period	1997-20155		
Year	
	
Change	in	
Outstanding	
Mortgage	
Levels	
X	U.S.		
$billions			
	 Change	in	
Outstanding	
Mortgage	
Levels		
X	U.S.		
$billions		
	 Change	in	
Outstanding	
Mortgage	
Levels	
X	U.S.	
$billions	1997	 		180	 2004	 			950	 2011	 		-	220	1998	 		301	 2005	 1,053	 2012	 		-	209	1999	 		377	 2006	 			998	 2013	 		-			83	2000	 		382	 2007	 			701	 2014	 		-						0.5	2001	 		509	 2008	 		-		32	 2015	 							62.5*	2002	 		706	 2009	 		-	161	 	 	2003	 		881	 2010	 		-	504	 	 		 *Per	30th	September	2015	Table	2	clearly	shows	the	boom	and	bust	of	mortgage	lending	in	the	U.S.	What	it	also	 shows	 is	 the	 long-term	 impact	 that	 an	 excessive	 home	 mortgage-lending	period	has	had.	Only	by	the	end	of	the	third	quarter	in	2015	does	one	see	a	very	small	 increase	 in	mortgage	 lending	again.	After	eight	years	of	adjustment	since	2007,	 the	modest	 level	 of	mortgage	 growth	of	 1997	has	not	 been	 reached	 yet.	This	shows	a	nearly	20-year	cycle.		
1.5	The	importance	of	household	real	estate	holdings	The	U.S	 Balance	 Sheet	 of	Households	 and	Non-profit	 Organizations	 has	 shown	the	importance	of	the	value	of	real	estate	compared	to	the	total	asset	base	of	all																																																										5	http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/current/data.htm		
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																																																													CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		individual	 households.	 From	 the	 latest	Balance	 Sheet	 of	 30th	 September	2015,	one	 can	deduce	 that	 the	 collective	 of	 individual	 households	 own	property	 to	 a	value	 of	 $21.826	 trillion	 in	 aggregate.	 This	 figure	 represents	 nearly	 22%	of	 all	assets	as	per	the	end	of	September	2015.	What	is	more	important	is	how	home	acquisitions	have	been	financed.	From	the	same	Balance	Sheet	one	may	observe	that	 the	 outstanding	 level	 of	mortgage	 loans	was	 close	 to	 $9.5	 trillion.	Neither	figure	 should	 however	 be	 viewed	 in	 isolation.	 It	 is	 encouraging	 that	 owners’	equity	in	homes	has	increased	to	56.7%	as	per	the	end	of	the	third	quarter	2015.	This	 is	very	close	 to	 the	57.6%	as	per	 the	 last	quarter	of	1997	(the	percentage	having	sunk	to	37.0%	at	the	end	of	the	first	quarter	2009).			The	 main	 asset	 category	 of	 individual	 households	 was	 represented	 by	 the	financial	 assets	 classes,	 which	 consist	 of	 deposits,	 debt	 securities,	 corporate	equities,	mutual	 fund	shares,	pension	entitlements	and	equity	 in	non-corporate	businesses.	 Financial	 assets	 of	 U.S.	 individual	 households	 stood	 at	 $66.925	trillion	of	all	assets	as	of	30th	September	2015.		
	
2.	Why	 did	 the	 housing	market	 and	 then	 the	 economy	 collapse	 in	 2007-
2008?	
	The	 underlying	 cause	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008	was	 that	 banks	 and	other	financial	institutions	in	the	U.S.	and	in	other	countries	engaged	in	excessive	mortgage-lending	levels	over	the	period	1997-2007.	In	1997	the	annual	increase	in	mortgage-lending	 levels	 in	 the	U.S.	was	$180	billion;	by	2005	 it	had	reached	$1.053	trillion,	nearly	a	six-fold	increase.	This	trend	continued	unabated	in	2006	and	2007.	Banks	and	other	mortgage	originators	were	not	 stopped.	Banks	and	other	 financial	 institutions	 also	 failed	 to	 monitor	 their	 risk	 profiles	 in	 an	adequate	manner.	In	his	book:	The	Courage	to	Act6	,	Dr.	Bernanke	describes	in																																																												
						 		
						6	The	Courage	to	Act	by	Ben	S.	Bernanke,	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	Inc.	New	York,	2015	ISBN	978-0-393-24721		
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																																																													CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		detail	what	the	main	players	within	the	Federal	Reserve	were	thinking	about	the	potential	 risks	 to	 the	U.S.	housing	markets,	but	also	how	no	government	entity	had	 overall	 control	 over	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 housing	 market	 and	 its	 funding	patterns.		The	 second	 cause	was	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 poor	 quality	mortgage	 products	gambling	 on	 house	 prices	 only	 going	 in	 one	 direction:	 upwards.	 The	 so-called	subprime	mortgage	portfolios	grew	rapidly	 from	2004	and	 later.	By	2008	their	level	had	 reached	$1.3	 trillion7	out	of	a	 total	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio	of	just	over	$10	trillion.		The	third	cause	was	a	manifestation	of	the	classical	finance	dilemma	of	funding	short	what	 are	 very	much	 long-term	 obligations.	 The	wanton	 securitization	 of	mortgage	portfolios	turned	long-term	risks	into	daily	tradable	risks.	When	poor	and	 good	 risks	 were	 mixed	 up,	 the	 result	 was	 when	 some	 of	 the	 higher	 risk	assets	 turned	sour,	 liquidity	 in	 the	 financial	markets	quickly	dried	up	 for	 these	products.		It	 is	 in	 against	 this	 background	 that	 the	 Federal	Reserve	 stepped	 in	 to	 restore	financial	and	economic	stability	in	the	markets.	Liquidity	was	provided	to	banks	that	 had	 sound	 collateral	 to	 offer.	 For	 economic	 stability	 interest	 rates	 were	lowered	to	the	lowest	rates	on	record.		Most	banks	were	saved	and	some	$4.2	trillion	was	used	to	buy	both	government	securities	 and	mortgage	 bonds.	 The	 actions	 taken	 by	 governments	 raise	many	questions.	A	 fundamental	one	 is	whether	 the	 collective	of	mortgage	borrowers	should	have	been	rescued	rather	than	(or	as	well	as)	the	banking	sector?	Should	economic	priority	have	been	given	to	the	collective	of	borrowers	rather	than	to	the	 lenders?	 Should	 economic	 stability	 measures	 have	 been	 extended	 to	individual	households?		
2.1	Was	an	alternative	solution	possible?		There	are	strong	reasons	to	believe	that	a	primary	focus	on	the	borrowers	rather	than	 on	 the	 lenders	would	 have	 avoided	 the	worst	 of	 the	 economic	 downturn	that	followed	the	excessive	lending	pattern	over	the	period	1997-2007.			The	 first	 reason	 is	 that	 each	 individual	 borrower	 has	 no	 control	 over	 the	behavior	 of	 other	 borrowers.	 No	 individual	 determined	 or	 determines	 the	collective	mortgage	lending	levels;	only	the	banks	and	other	financial	institutions	do.	However	all	 borrowers	and	potential	 ones	are	affected	 if	 excessive	 lending	levels	take	place.																																																													7	http://business.cch.com/images/banner/subprime.pdf	
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																																																										CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Secondly,	 the	 legal	 system	 works	 fully	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 banks.	 Once	individuals	enter	into	a	debt	obligation,	that	obligation	must	be	met	and	the	debt	repaid	according	to	the	law.	There	is	no	need	to	change	the	laws,	but	economic	sense	 should	prevail	 and	 assist	 borrowers	 in	 their	 abilities	 to	 repay	 long-term	loans.		The	 third	 reason	 is	 based	 on	 the	 “recovery	 mechanism”	 utilized.	 From	 2006-2013	21.3	million	U.S.	households	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	or	nearly	45%	of	all	mortgagors.	Over	the	same	period	5.8	million	homes	were	repossessed;	 1	 out	 of	 every	 8	 households	with	 a	mortgage.	 Such	 “mechanism”	drives	 house	 prices	 down,	 reduces	 income	 levels	 for	 allocation	 to	 other	 goods	and	 services	 and	 reduces	 the	 incentive	 to	 borrow.	Over	 the	 period	 2007-2014	the	collective	of	U.S.	households	reduced	 their	net	outstanding	mortgage	 levels	by	 more	 than	 10%	 or	 $1.2	 trillion.	 The	 priority	 in	 most	 household	 income	allocation	 was	 switched	 to	 loan	 servicing.	 Such	 actions	 reduce	 consumption	levels	 and	 thereby	 government	 tax	 revenues.	 Both	 factors	 conspired	 to	 slow	down	economic	growth	levels.		Finally,	 the	 $4.2	 trillion	 injected	 into	 the	 U.S.	 economy	 by	way	 of	 quantitative	easing	 did	 not	 directly	 address	 the	 income	 position	 of	 borrowers.	 It	 did	positively	affect	financial	asset	prices	like	shares	and	bonds,	but	this	was	of	little	benefit	to	those	median	and	lower	income	households	who	constituted	the	bulk	of	the	affected	borrowers.	The	latter	groups	do	not	own	many	shares	or	bonds;	hence	they	need	to	borrow	for	buying	a	home.	In	the	U.S.,	the	historically	lowest	interest	 rates	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 mortgage	 borrowings,	 rather	 the	opposite.			
3.	The	economic	effects	of	over-	and	underfunding	of	the	U.S.	housing	
market	
	For	 individual	 households	 to	 use	 other	 people’s	 money	 to	 acquire	 an	 asset	 is	tantamount	to	fixing	a	claim	on	future	earnings.	Governments	practice	this	all	the	time,	 not	 only	 to	 acquire	 assets,	 but	 also	 to	 fund	 current	 expenditure.	 All	households,	rich	and	poor,	will	ultimately	have	to	foot	this	government’s	bill.			For	 individual	 households,	 some	 will	 need	 to	 fund	 their	 home	 acquisition	 by	taking	out	a	mortgage.	The	timing	depends	on	age,	income	levels	and	(inherited)	wealth.	Households	on	a	lower	or	median	income	will	more	often	than	not	need	a	mortgage.		In	previous	papers	by	this	author	regarding	Collective	Household	Economics8,	it	was	explained	that	the	overfunding	process	should	have	been	curtailed	from	as	early	 as	 2002.	 It	 was	 also	 explained	 that	 from	 2004	 onwards	 the	 credit	 risk	parameters	were	loosened.	From	2004,	the	share	of	sub-prime	mortgages	in	the																																																																																																																								8	https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66851/1/MPRA_paper_66851.pdf	
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																																																												CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			overall	mortgage	portfolio	was	substantially	 increased	within	a	rising	portfolio.	Moreover,	 the	 use	 of	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 increased	 dramatically,	combining	low	and	high-risk	mortgages.	When	some	of	the	high-risk	mortgages	started	 to	 default,	 liquidity	 in	 the	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 markets	disappeared,	as	happened	in	2007	and	the	financial	crisis	started	to	unfold.		What	 tables	 1	 and	 2	 clearly	 show	 is	 that	 by	 2009	 new	 housing	 construction	dropped	to	about	one	third	of	the	level	of	2006	and	that	households	started	the	reduce	their	collective	outstanding	mortgage	levels.			Combine	 this	with	a	very	rapid	 increase	 in	unemployment	 levels	 in	2008-2009	and	the	huge	pressure	on	mortgage	borrowers	to	repay	their	loans:	nearly	45%	of	mortgagors	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	during	the	period	2006-2013	 and	 5.8	 million	 homes	 were	 repossessed.	 Disposable	 incomes	available	 for	 the	consumption	of	other	goods	and	services,	after	 loan	servicing,	dropped	 substantially.	 The	Collective	of	 Individual	Households	was	 confronted	with	 an	 income	 crisis.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 this	 development,	U.S.	 government	tax	revenues	dropped	substantially	from	the	level	of	$2.57	trillion	in	FY	2007	to	$2.10	 trillion	 in	 FY	 2009.	 Only	 by	 2013	 did	 the	 nominal	 level	 of	 tax	 revenues	exceed	 the	 level	 of	 2007.	At	 the	 same	 time	 government	 expenditure	 increased	substantially,	 leading	 to	 huge	 increases	 in	 outstanding	 government	 debt.	 U.S.	government	debt	levels	nearly	doubled	from	$9	trillion	in	2007	to	$17.8	trillion	by	the	end	of	2014.			
4.	The	case	for	supporting	the	Collective	of	Individual	Households	
	Economic	policy	makers	always	have	choices.	In	the	lead	up	to	2007,	the	choice	could	 have	made	 to	 slow	down	 the	mortgage	 lending	 activities	 of	 the	 banking	sector.	 	 The	 U.S.	 government	 did	 not	 go	 for	 this	 option.	 Instead,	 the	 Federal	Reserve	 took	 the	 decision	 in	 2004-2006	 to	make	 borrowings	more	 expensive.	The	base	rate	was	gradually	increased	from	1%	in	2004	to	5.25%	in	2006.	This	option	focused	wholly	on	the	costs	of	funds,	which	means	costs	that	are	allocated	to	the	borrowers:	among	others,	the	individual	households.	The	Fed	and	others	did	 not	 restrict	 the	 lenders	 in	 their	 lending	 practices.	 There	 was	 no	 quality	control	over	the	mortgage	products	on	offer;	there	was	no	effort	made	to	restrict	the	 volume	 of	 lending	 through	 bank	 reserve	 requirements	 and	 there	 was	 no	guiding	 philosophy	 other	 than	 the	 one	 propagated	 by	 the	 investment	 banking	community	that	turning	long-term	mortgage	risks	into	daily	liquidity	risks	was	a	sound	“free	market”	principle.		When	 the	crisis	occurred,	 the	 institutional	 framework	was	put	 in	place	 to	save	some	banks,	AIG,	 and	some	major	 companies.	What	was	also	put	 in	place	was:	quantitative	easing.	This	was	the	Fed’s	program	that	injected	$4.2	trillion	in	the	purchase	of	U.S.	government	bonds	and	mortgage-backed	securities.		
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																																										CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			What	if	the	choice	had	been	made	to	help	the	21.3	million	households	who	faced	foreclosure	 proceedings	 and	 the	 5.8	 million	 households	 whose	 homes	 were	repossessed?		
	
4.1	Quantifying	the	potential	costs	of	support	for	individual	households		In	 2007	 the	 47.5	million	 U.S.	 households	 who	 had	 a	mortgage,	 had	 borrowed	$10.613	 trillion	 in	 total;	 on	 average	 an	 outstanding	 mortgage	 amount	 of	$223,431	per	household.	Over	the	period	2006-2013	21.3	million	households	got	into	financial	difficulties	as	foreclosure	proceedings	were	started	against	them.	
	
Table	3	U.S.	Foreclosure	statistics	2006-20149	
	
	
Year 
Foreclosure          Completed              Home 
Filings                    Foreclosures         Repossessions 
                                            
Completed Foreclosures Home Repossessions 2014	 1,117,426																						575,378																									327,069	 575,378	 327,069	2013	 1,369,405																						921,064																									463,108	 921,064	 463,108	2012	 2,300,000																			2,100,000																									700,000	 2,100,000	 700,000	2011	 3,920,418																			3,580,000																						1,147,000	 3,580,000	 1,147,000		2010	 3,843,548																			3,500,000																						1,125,000	 3,500,000	 1,125,000	2009	 3,457,643																			2,920,000																										945,000	 2,920,000	 945,000	2008	 3,019,482																			2,350,000																										679,000	 2,350,000	 679,000	2007	 2,203,295																			1,260,000																										489,000	 1,260,000	 489,000	2006	 1,215,304																						545,000																											268,532	 545,000	 268,532	
	
		Over	 the	period	2006-2013	 the	21.3	million	households	would	have	accounted	for	approximately	$4.76	trillion	out	of	the	total	of	outstanding	mortgage	level	of	$10.613	 trillion.	 This	 assumption	 is	 based	 on	 the	 understanding	 that	 the	 21.3	million	 households	 would	 have	 been	 equally	 distributed	 over	 the	 higher	 and	lower	income	classes.	What	likely	happened	is	that	the	lower	income	classes																																																																																																																							9http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/ 
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																																																															CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			would	have	experienced	the	highest	level	of	foreclosure	proceedings,	especially	in	 view	 of	 the	 sub-prime	 mortgage	 push	 from	 2004	 onwards,	 but	 that	 at	 the	same	time	the	amounts	per	household	for	the	lower	income	classes	would	have	been	lower	than	the	average.		Assuming	 the	 remaining	 maturity	 of	 this	 portfolio	 was	 20	 years	 (which	 is	probably	on	the	short	side	as	nearly	40%	of	the	increase	in	total	mortgage	levels	was	incurred	between	1998	and	2007),	on	an	equal	repayment	basis	the	annual	repayment	obligations	 for	 the	21.3	million	households	would	have	been	5%	of	$4.76	 trillion	 that	equals	$238	billion.	Add	 to	 the	 repayment,	 the	2007	 interest	rate	of	6.2%	for	a	30-year	mortgage	and	this	amounts	to	$295	billion	per	annum.	The	total	debt	servicing	for	the	21.3	million	households	would	have	added	up	to	$533	billion	per	annum.		One	may	argue	that	the	low	to	median	income	groups,	with	a	median	income	of	nominal	 $50,233	 in	 2007	 according	 to	 the	U.S	 Census	Bureau,	would	not	 have	had	 an	 average	mortgage	 debt	 level	 of	 $233,431,	 but	 a	much	 lower	 level	 than	this.	 However	 the	 economic	 hardship	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 foreclosure	proceedings	 would	 likely	 have	 been	more	 concentrated	 on	 the	 lower	 income-earning	households.		If	all	21.3	million	households	would	have	needed	help	to	meet	the	mortgage	debt	servicing	 and	 that	 such	 help	 would	 have	 represented	 50%	 of	 the	 annual	servicing	 costs,	 then	 the	 annual	 bill	 would	 have	 been	 about	 $270	 billion	 each	year	 from	 2006-2013.	 	 Table	 3	 indicates	 that	 not	 all	 of	 the	 21.3	 million	households	did	need	support	from	day	one	in	2006.	If	 the	calculation	had	been	made	 on	 basis	 of	 the	 actual	 annual	 number	 of	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 per	annum,	the	total	bill	would	have	been	$1.173	trillion	spread	out	over	the	years	2006-2013.		It	 is	 debatable	 whether	 selecting	 the	 21.3	 million	 households	 out	 of	 all	households	having	a	mortgage	 represents	a	 fair	 selection	criterion.	The	 reason	why	 banks	 have	 to	 initiate	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 often	 represents	 an	underlying	 failure	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 banks	 to	 conduct	 their	 customer	 due	diligence	to	an	appropriate	standard.	They	should	have	ensured	that	household	incomes	 could,	 all	 other	 things	 being	 equal,	 afford	 to	 repay	 their	 outstanding	mortgage	obligations.				
4.2	The	economic	consequences	of	such	help	for	households	
	If	the	political	choice	to	help	households	rather	than	banks	had	been	announced	in	early	2008,	the	positive	economic	consequences	would	have	been	numerous.	Only	 Congress	 could	 have	 made	 such	 choice,	 as	 it	 would	 have	 had	 to	 accept	financial	risks	on	households	and	on	their	home	values.																																																													
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																																																															CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			The	 first	positive	effect	would	have	been	 that	 the	number	of	credit	defaults	on	home	 mortgages	 would	 have	 been	 very	 low	 indeed.	 This	 would	 have	 had	materially	positive	consequences	for	the	mortgage-backed	securities	market,	as	the	much-reduced	 number	 of	 defaults	 would	 likely	 not	 have	 led	 to	 a	 liquidity	crisis	for	such	securities.			Secondly	 U.S.	 banks	 plus	 Fannie	Mae	 and	 Freddy	Mac,	 collectively	 holding	 the	lion	 share	 of	 the	 total	 U.S.	 mortgage	 portfolio	 would	 also	 have	 experienced	 a	greatly	 reduced	 level	 of	 doubtful	 debtors.	 Both	 the	 liquidity	 and	 the	 solvency	risks	for	these	institutions	would	have	been	drastically	lowered.	The	number	of	banking	institutions	under	threat	would	have	been	greatly	reduced.	The	rescue	of	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddy	Mac	would	not	have	been	necessary.		Thirdly	 the	 increased	 ability	 by	 mortgage	 holders	 to	 repay	 their	 outstanding	mortgage	 debt	 in	 an	 orderly	 fashion	 would	 have	 helped	 these	 households	 to	maintain	 most	 of	 their	 consumption	 levels	 on	 other	 goods	 and	 services.	 The	economic	 benefits	 for	 the	 manufacturing	 and	 services	 sectors	 would	 be	substantial,	as	the	reduction	in	consumer	demand	would	have	been	minimalized.	The	U.S.	government	in	its	tax	revenues	would	have	greatly	benefitted	from	the	improved	 level	 of	 economic	 activities.	 With	 the	 same	 token	 government	expenditure	 levels	 would	 have	 shown	 a	 slower	 growth	 path.	 The	 need	 for	government	borrowings	would	have	been	drastically	cut.		Fourthly	 house	 prices	 would	 have	 held	 up	 better,	 as	 the	 threat	 of	 5.8	 million	home	 repossessions	 and	 forced	 sales	 of	 homes	 would	 have	 been	 greatly	diminished.		Fifthly	there	would	have	been	a	much	more	limited	need	for	quantitative	easing	rather	than	the	$4.2	trillion	still	outstanding.		Last	but	not	 least,	 the	number	of	 job	 losses	would	have	been	 less,	as	economic	activity	levels	would	have	been	maintained	at	a	higher	level.			
	
4.3	The	moral	hazard	question	
	If	 banks	 knew	 in	 advance	 that	 arrangements	 would	 be	 in	 place	 which	 would	rescue	 them	 from	 the	 consequences	 of	 excessive	 risk	 taking,	 they	 might	 be	tempted	 to	 take	 on	 even	more	 risks:	moral	 hazard.	As	was	 the	 case,	 nearly	 all	large	banks	had	gambled	on	a	government	bailout,	as	they	were	perceived	to	be	“too	 big	 to	 fail”.	 The	 economic	 consequences	 of	 a	 major	 bank	 failure	 were	regarded	as	unacceptable	as	many	more	households	and	other	banks	would	have	seen	their	assets	become	worthless.																																																																																																																																
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																																																													CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		If	individual	mortgage	borrowers	would	know	that	in	case	times	turn	tough,	they	would	be	helped,	 they	might	 also	be	 tempted	 to	borrow	more	 than	 they	 could	afford,	 or	 claim	 more	 quickly	 in	 stating	 that	 they	 could	 not	 afford	 the	 debt	servicing.		Executing	 a	 borrowers’	 support	 program	 should	 therefore	 be	 accompanied	 by	rules	 that	 impact	 both	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 the	 Collective	 of	 Individual	Households.		On	the	banking	side	the	rescue	of	mortgage	borrowers	should	be	predicated	on	there	being	an	environment	of	excessive	 lending.	Banks	make	excessive	profits	during	such	a	period	until	the	levels	of	doubtful	debtors	go	up.	If	a	government	decides	to	implement	a	borrowers’	rescue	program,	banks	will	stand	to	generate	even	 more	 profits,	 thanks	 to	 the	 improved	 risk	 environment.	 Therefore	 it	 is	logical	 that	 banks	 are	 taxed	 in	 line	 with	 such	 excess	 profits,	 both	 during	 the	excessive	levels	of	lending	as	well	as	during	the	borrowers	rescue	program.	In	a	way,	 the	 heavy	 fines	 regulators	 have	 imposed	 on	 a	 number	 of	 banks	 already	demonstrate	this	logic	albeit	applied	in	a	retrospective	fashion.		On	the	mortgage	borrowers	side,	the	fact	that	they	need	to	be	helped	should	not	be	a	scot-free	process.	What	the	government	could	legislate	for	is	the	creation	of	a	“sub-ordinate”	type	of	mortgage.	The	amount	granted	to	a	household	would	be	covered	by	a	subordinate	claim	on	the	asset:	the	home.			
4.3.1	The	“subordinate”	mortgage	
	The	key	objective	 for	 a	program	 to	help	borrowers	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	mortgage	borrowers	can	service	their	outstanding	mortgage	obligations	in	a	manner	that	does	not	curtail	their	spending	levels	on	other	goods	and	services	too	severely.		The	program	may	last	a	number	of	years,	but	is	certainly	for	a	limited	period	of	time.		From	the	moment	the	government	declares	that	its	support	program	will	start	to	the	moment	that	it	declares	that	there	is	no	need	for	further	support,	individual	households	who	 face	 foreclosure	 proceedings	 could	 be	 supported	 by	 getting	 a	temporary	interest	free	loan	from	the	government.	The	loan	could	be	channeled	through	 the	Fed	 in	 a	process	of	direct	 rather	 than	 indirect	quantitative	easing.	The	loan	could	be	administered	by	state	sponsored	enterprises,	like	Freddy	Mac	and	Fannie	Mae,	for	instance.		As	 long	 as	 the	 program	 is	 effective,	 individual	 households	 may	 receive	 loan	support	 payments	 on	 an	 annual,	 quarterly	 or	 monthly	 basis.	 The	 size	 of	 the	payments	 may	 vary	 according	 to	 the	 income	 category	 of	 the	 individual	households.	 For	 instance	 the	 lowest	 income	 groups	may	 receive	 60%	 of	 their	monthly	 mortgage	 debt	 servicing.	 Higher	 income	 groups	 may	 receive	 a	 lower	percentage.	
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																																																										CHE:	Why	borrowers	rather	than	banks	should	have	been	rescued!	©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		As	collateral	 for	 the	government,	a	 “subordinated”	claim	on	 the	property	could	be	established.	Such	subordination	is	subordinate	to	the	existing	lender’s	claim.	As	the	program	is	meant	to	stimulate	the	economy,	the	borrower	will	not	need	to	pay	any	interest	or	principal	amount	over	the	funds	provided	by	the	government	for	 as	 long	 as	 the	 rescue	 operation	 is	 effective.	 Banks	 and	 other	 financial	companies	involved	in	mortgage	products	should	pay	the	government	for	taking	over	some	of	the	risks:	a	risk	premium.		Once	the	rescue	operation	is	declared	closed,	payments	to	the	households	stop.	For	 the	 subsequent	 periods	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 households	 are	 not	 obliged	 or	only	 to	 a	 limited	 extent	 to	 repay	 principal	 amounts.	 Voluntary	 repayments	should	 always	 be	 welcomed.	 It	 is	 also	 suggested	 that	 interest	 payments	 will	become	due	at	a	rate	equal	to	the	10-year	funding	rate	for	government	debt	plus	a	small	administration	fee.	The	ultimate	repayment	of	principal	may	take	place	upon	 the	 passing	 away	 of	 the	 owner(s)	 or	 earlier	 if	 this	 is	 the	 owner’s	 wish.	Transfer	 of	 mortgage	 debt	 from	 one	 property	 to	 another	 should	 be	 made	possible.	However	any	subsequent	 increase	 in	mortgage	amount	should	have	a	lower	ranking	than	the	government	provided	loan.		The	 risks	 of	 this	 program	 to	 government	 finances	 are	 relatively	 small.	 Against	the	 payout	 of	 the	 $1.173	 trillion	 over	 a	 number	 of	 years	 are	 the	 benefits	 in	macro-economic	 terms	of	higher	consumption	and	production	 levels	as	well	as	higher	employment	levels.	All	these	elements	will	most	likely	contribute	more	in	tax	revenues	than	the	cost	of	the	program.	On	top	of	this	it	is	a	loan	program	and	not	a	gift	to	individual	households.		
	
4.3.2	Possible	moral	hazards.	
	Once	the	rescue	operation	is	declared	to	have	started,	it	might	be	foreseen	that	some	borrowers	may	be	unduly	quick	to	turn	to	the	government	for	support.		The	adoption	of	a	few	constraining	factors	should	be	considered.	The	first	one	is	that	the	rescue	program	should	not	provide	more	than	a	fixed	percentage	of	the	monthly	 obligations.	 The	 percentage	 may	 differ	 from	 income	 class	 to	 income	class,	but	it	should	not	eliminate	the	responsibility	of	the	borrowers	to	share	in	the	monthly	mortgage	debt	servicing.		Secondly,	in	the	event	of	excessive	applications,	an	administrative	brake	may	be	used,	so	as	to	slow	the	number	of	loans	being	granted	(which	is	the	type	of	action	which	 should	have	been	applied	 to	mortgage	 lending	practices	 especially	 from	2002-2007).					
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5.	Some	conclusions		
• The	2007-2008	crisis	and	its	aftermath	have	shown	that	the	Fed	did	what	it	could,	which	is	providing	the	economy	with	enough	liquidity.	What	the	Fed	cannot	do	is	to	restore	solvency,	not	to	banks,	not	to	companies	and	not	to	individual	households.	The	housing	crisis	led	to	a	solvency	problem	for	at	least	45%	of	all	mortgagors	over	the	period	2007-2014.	It	was	up	to	members	of	Congress	to	consider	formulating	a	temporary	solvency	plan	for	these	households.	Under	the	current	economic	pressures	drafting	such	plan	 for	 future	use	might	well	 be	 opportune.	 The	 lessons	 from	 the	past	crisis	show	that	such	program	makes	economic	sense.	
	
• The	 introduction	 of	 a	 plan	 to	 help	 individual	 households	 to	 meet	 their	home	mortgage	obligations	 in	times	of	stress	has	many	advantages	over	the	methods	currently	in	use.		
	
• The	main	advantage	is	that	it	helps	an	economy	to	recover	faster	and	in	a	more	 efficient	 manner	 than	 providing	 short-term	 liquidity	 to	 banks,	raising	or	 lowering	of	base	rates	and	printing	money	 in	order	to	buy	up	government	treasuries	and	mortgage	bonds.	
	
• For	instance,	in	the	case	of	the	U.S.,	it	would	have	avoided	most	of	the	$9	trillion	increase	in	the	government	debt	level	over	the	period	2007-2014.	Government	 debt	 is	 a	 debt	 to	 be	 repaid	 by	 all	 individual	 households	 in	future	 years.	 Helping	mortgage	 debt	 holders	 in	 times	 of	 stress	 reduces	government	debt	accumulation	levels	for	all	households.	
	
• Helping	mortgage	debt	holders	at	times	of	stress	also	reduces	risks	to	the	banking	sector,	including	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddy	Mac.	For	this	reduction	in	 risks	banks	 should	be	 asked	 to	pay	 a	premium	 to	 the	 government	 in	compensation	for	such	transfer	of	risks.		
• Helping	 mortgage	 debt	 holders	 to	 overcome	 short-term	 cash	 flow	problems	helps	them	to	stay	in	their	properties,	with	all	the	advantages	of	avoiding	high	levels	of	home	repossessions	and	forced	home	sales.	House	prices	levels	will	be	less	affected.			
• Helping	mortgage	 debt	 holders	with	 their	 cash	 flow	 problems	will	 also	allow	consumption	levels	of	other	goods	and	services	to	be	less	affected.	It	will	help	to	avoid	big	spikes	in	unemployment	levels.		
• Last	but	not	 least	 helping	mortgage	debt	holders	 in	 times	of	 stress	 also	reduces	the	gap	between	rich	and	poor,	as	 the	 lower	 income	classes	are	more	 vulnerable	 and	 less	 capable	 than	 the	 richer	 classes	 to	 overcome	short-term	cash	flow	problems.	
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